Some applications require an assurance that certain criteria are violated with only low probability. An alert is generated when the current course of action is likely to violate assurance criteria and the alert results in corrective action. Assurance monitors fuse information from multiple data streams generated by sensors and other sources to estimate the probability distribution of system trajectories. is distribution is used to determine whether an assurance constraint is likely to be violated. e acquisition of data requires resources such as energy, computational power and communication bandwidth which are scarce in many applications. At each point in time the system must decide whether to expend these resources to get more data to improve the con dence in the probability distribution of trajectories. is paper presents a so ware-design pa ern for assurance monitoring and gives examples of its uses, including an application of the pa ern to the problem of autonomous navigation of a drone which is required to avoid no-y zones while using limited resources.
INTRODUCTION
So ware design pa erns entered the vocabulary of the broad so ware engineering community with the publication of the classic book by Gamma, Vlissides, Johnson, and Helm [10] . e concept provided systems designers with a convenient way of describing solutions to common problems, along with an analysis of the consequences of adopting the prescribed solutions. More than two decades a er its publication, the concept remains in uential to the way so ware engineers think about problem solving. Today, design pa erns have been adopted across a variety of domains beyond object-oriented design including security [9] , generic programming [16] , graphics [13] and distributed data processing [15] , demonstrating the general appeal of the concept.
ough the term was originally borrowed from architecture [1] , designing systems by composing well-understood elements is inherent to the practice of engineering. For example, control systems that use feedback can robustly maintain their behaviour under state changes, and controller pa erns such as proportional-integral-derivative (PID) are used to construct systems with well-understood behavior.
Pa erns play a particularly important role in distributed systems, whose design may be hard to change a er they are deployed. Pa erns such as communication over queues, message brokering [14] , and publish/subscribe [4] provide systems with desirable qualities such as fault tolerance, scalability, loose coupling and guaranteed-once delivery [7] . Enterprise integration has long bene ted from the availability of so ware platforms that support such pa erns. Novel pa erns are being discovered in several emerging domains that involve event-based systems. In cloud computing, immutable data storage [2] addresses the combined challenge of scale and latency. In IoT, shadowing and triggering [24] address intermi ent availability of networked, energy-constrained devices, and metering [23] enables associated business models. In cyber-physical systems, the way in which these systems are deployed and interact with one another gives rise to pa erns to deal with time and synchronization [12] and the need to adapt to changes in resources and the operating environment [21] . Pa erns can help to get more widespread adoption of event-based systems (EBS) ideas and so ware. A person developing an EBS application may not be able to use a program wri en by someone else exactly as the program is wri en. is could be because the programming language in the earlier application is di erent from the new one, or the libraries that the earlier application used may be di erent from those that the developer wants to use (e.g. MATLAB versus Python SciPy Toolkits). Nevertheless, many EBS applications have similar constructs, and o en these constructs can be represented as reusable pa erns. is paper proposes a pa ern for applications that monitor and, if necessary, take steps to correct, the behavior of systems. e structure of the pa ern can be represented by a graph in which the vertices are agents and the edges represent information ow. e behavior of an agent is that it is asleep and not carrying out any computation until it is woken up by a clock or by the arrival of information from another agent. e agent can "pull" information; for example it can call a GPS sensor when it wants a GPS reading. Also, information can be "pushed" to agents; for example, an agent may receive a stream of accelerations. is structure has been described since the inception of EBS, and books on EBS [5, 8, 18] describe this pa ern in one form or another. e contribution of this paper is to use this structure to form a pa ern that is used in a particular kind of EBS application: assurance monitoring. e pa ern uses agents for Bayesian fusion of information from multiple sources, predicting future system behavior, and checking whether future behavior is likely to violate constraints. e way in which agents are connected can vary from application to application though all assurance monitors have the same essential structure to deal with the question: Is future behavior safe? e pa ern is used for a speci c application of drone navigation, which is discussed in detail; then the use of the same pa ern in other applications is described brie y. An implementation of the pa ern, in Python, is freely available [3] . e assurance monitor pa ern arises o en in event-based systems and, in particular, addresses the need to predict undesirable behavior in autonomous systems, whose behavior is di cult to analyze. Such systems are currently being introduced across all of the aforementioned domains, spurred by recent advances in machine learning. e rest of this paper describes the assurance monitor pa ern (Section 2), describes an instance of the pa ern implemented in Python (Section 3), discusses experimental results based on this implementation (Section 4), and concludes with a discussion of its use in a second application (Section 5). Figure 1 illustrates the general problem solved by an assurance monitor, in terms of a system state space that consists of a safe region, where the system is intended to operate, and an unsafe region, where there is some risk of harm. e assurance monitor predicts the future trajectory of the system, and estimates when the probability of entering the unsafe region exceeds a threshold, which corresponds to a safety margin around the unsafe region. Assurance monitors can observe multiple thresholds, which may correspond to di erent behavior such as a warning, a request for more information, or a corrective action. e state space of a system can include both discrete and continuous dimensions. Discrete states arise from computational aspects of the system's behavior, and include the number/type of processor cores or amount of memory available to distribute the system's computations over, and the maximal clock rate that can be utilized without overheating the system. Continuous dimensions arise from the physical aspects of the system, and include space, time, temperature, voltage and current.
ASSURANCE MONITORING
Generally, to make computational analysis of such hybrid (discrete/continuous) systems tractable, continuous dimensions are discretized by dividing the space into a nite number of regions. One thus obtains a discrete representation of the system that can be reasoned about using traditional techniques. For example, by assuming that each state is a time-dependent random variable we obtain Markov model that, given a probability distribution over the system states at the current time, and probabilities for transitioning between each of the discrete states, can be used to predict future system state probability distributions. is process is illustrated in Figure 2 , where each time instant is represented by a column of discrete states, with possible transitions from states at the current time contributing to the probability of states at the next time. e problem of assurance monitoring of autonomous systems can be complex. Here we point out a few of the factors that make the problem di cult in the context of autonomous drone navigation. e no-y zone can be a complex structure; if no-y zones consist of densely populated areas in an urban region then the zones can form complex geometrical shapes. e optimal use of scarce resources is di cult in these situations because resources when ying over simpler shapes may have to be saved for later use, when ying over complex structures. One approach is to use a nite-horizon dynamic program and particle lters. is paper only considers simple no-y geometries, does not use dynamic programs, and limits decision-making algorithms to simple heuristics.
A problem with visual navigation (using photographs) is that the drone may be estimated, with high probability, to be in multiple locations that are far apart. Consider the case of a drone ying east which is estimated, with high probability, to be in location A and with equal probability to be in a distant location B. If a no-y zone abuts A to the north and a no-y zone abuts B to the south, then optimal control can be complex. In this paper, we assume that the drone is in the (single) location with the maximum likelihood probability.
Much more work needs to be done on the code developed so far for use in visual autonomous navigation. We believe, however, that our continued development of the application will continue to use assurance monitoring pa erns. Moreover, the pa ern can be used with very di erent applications. As earlier papers and books on event processing have suggested implicitly, the use of EBS pa erns can help the wider community develop event-processing applications. 
AN ASSURANCE MONITOR PATTERN
Some event-based applications require an assurance that certain criteria are satis ed at all times or are violated with only low probability. An alert is generated when the current course of action is likely to violate assurance criteria. e alert results in corrective action. is pa ern concerns the detection of events that signal the probable violation of assurance criteria. e pa ern can be summarized as follows:
Given limited knowledge about the behavior of an event-based application, avoid violating an assurance criterion by predicting future events, using data from multiple sources to improve the accuracy of the prediction.
Intent and Motivation
Assurance monitors fuse information from multiple data streams generated by sensors and other sources to estimate the probability distribution of system trajectories. is distribution is used to determine whether an assurance constraint is likely to be violated. e acquisition of data may require resources such as energy, computational power or communication bandwidth which are scarce in many applications, or incur charges which should be kept to a minimum. At each point in time the system must decide whether to expend these resources to get more data to improve the con dence in the probability distribution of trajectories.
Informally speaking, the system should not expend its resource budget to get more data when it is con dent that the current trajectory will not violate assurance criteria for a speci ed time horizon. If, however, the system is not con dent that the assurance criteria can be maintained, then if adequate resources are available the system should spend part of its resource budget to get additional data to get a be er estimate of the state probability distribution. If the system is not con dent that the assurance criteria can be maintained and its resources are depleted then it should generate an alert signaling the need for a course correction. e assurance monitor balances the need for ensuring that constraints are not violated while ensuring that resources are not depleted. 
Structure
An assurance monitor pa ern is a network of di erent types of agents ( Figure 3 ). Each agent is a smaller pa ern in itself. A data source agent ( Figure 4a ) acquires data, for example from a sensor; this data is acquired when the agent is requested to do so by a decision maker agent or by a system clock. A data fusion agent ( Figure 4b ) reads an estimate of the probability distribution over system states and data from a set of sources and outputs a new estimate of the distribution. A prediction agent ( Figure 4c ) reads an estimate of the probability distribution over system states and a control signal and outputs a new estimate of the distribution. A check violation agent (Figure 4d ) computes the probability of an assurance violation event. e input to a check-violation agent is a probability distribution on the trajectory; it outputs either:
(1) an alert signaling the need for a course correction, or (2) a request to get additional data from a set of data sources, or (3) a continue message indicating that the current plan is safe. Computation agents look up data repositories or carry out computations to add value to the data. For example, a computation agent may integrate stored historical data with raw sensor data. e agent network in Figure 3 contains a single fusion agent. More complex networks can be constructed, where the signals of source agents are composed sequentially (as we will see in Section 3) or in parallel, where agents execute concurrently.
e network in Figure 5 shows a network where agents are composed in both ways.
Consequences
Autonomous systems, particularly those whose behavior relies on components with partially unknown behavior such as those based on learned models, can incorporate an assurance monitor to retain some of the operational safety of manually controlled or manually programmed systems. e assurance monitor can aid in conserving scarce resources, by only activating system functions that consume these resources when necessary. e composition of fusion agents that propagate a stream of successive state estimates can increase the accuracy of the overall system beyond the accuracy of any individual agent, and compensate for several kinds of inaccuracies, including dri , noise and approximation. ese bene ts come at the cost of runtime overhead of the computations that are required for assurance monitoring, which may be considerable. As with most predictive systems, the detection of future assurance violation events can yield false positives. Under unfavorable conditions, or if the violation criteria are too conservative, the resulting actions may cause unnecessary remedial actions or instability in a system that would otherwise remain both safe and stable.
Next, we describe applications constructed by networks of these agents.
EXAMPLE APPLICATION: RESOURCE-CONSTRAINED AUTONOMOUS DRONE NAVIGATION
To help understand what instances of the pa ern can look like, we begin by reviewing an example that exhibits several characteristics that make the pa ern useful. e application is a drone, that is required to travel over a region while staying away from no-y zones. e drone operates autonomously using an on-board control system. Some recently proposed control systems for autonomous drones are entirely data-driven, meaning that the behavior of the drone is learned from a training set of sensor inputs [26] , which may even be captured on a di erent system [17] . e potential for autonomy in this approach is promising, but the learned behavior is generally not combined with manual speci cations, such as safety properties, meaning that the overall system may be unsafe if exposed to conditions not covered by the training set. An assurance monitor can serve as a bridge between these two worlds, yielding a system that is both autonomous and avoids assurance violations, for example by switching to a safe controller when the learned controller is predicted to take the system out of safety.
In our example, the drone has accelerometers and gyroscopes that enable it to estimate its 3-D acceleration. It takes photographs of the terrain periodically, and the drone may take additional photographs to improve location estimation. e drone may also activate other mechanisms, such as GPS, to improve its estimate. e use of these mechanisms consumes power and other resources, and so they must be used judiciously. e state of the drone is given by its (3-D) acceleration, velocity and location. A network of agents computes a probability distribution of the drone's current state at a point in time. e distribution at time t = 0 is given. e drone's trajectory over a time interval is its state at each point in the interval. e agents compute the distribution of trajectories to detect events that trigger actions such as "get more data" or "change course. " Figure 6 shows the network of agents that make up the drone navigation assurance monitor. Next, we describe the behavior of its key agents. 
Fusion Agents
Many fusion agents use the Bayesian update formula, and for completeness, we give the equation. In this example, probabilities and time steps are assumed to be discrete. Let a(t) be the planned acceleration at each point in the interval [T ,T + H ], and let a be the vector of accelerations over 
Since fusion agents update a probability distribution based on some additional data, the output of such an agent is a probability distribution, which can be used as the input to another fusion agent. Figure 6 shows an example of such a composition of fusion agents.
Fusion
Agent: C PS L e C PS L fusion agent implements a positioning system that approximates the location of the drone through an image-based matching algorithm [20] that utilizes the camera of that device. e location is approximated by matching the image, captured by the on-board camera, against a database of images stored on-board. Figure 7b shows that the raw location distribution reported by C PS L can be both uncertain and inaccurate under adverse conditions. is is a result of the input image that is fed to C PS L , corresponding to the area under the yellow rectangle, which is mostly cloud-covered water and lacks the distinct features that are needed for accurate matching. e uncertainty and error are mitigated by the C PS L fusion agent in the same simulation step, by fusing the C PS L distribution with the previous location distribution, updated with respect to the previous control action. Given the location distribution L T at the previous time T , updated with respect to the control signal for the time interval (T ,T ], and given the location distribution C T obtained from C PS L at the current time T , the location distribution L T for T is computed as follows:
where L x, denotes the probability density at location (x, ) in the distribution L, dim(C T ) is the set of coordinates of C T , and K
x , x,
is the probability that an image taken at (x, ) matches location (x , ). e map K is estimated by feeding each image in the C PS L image database as a query to C PS L , thus obtaining a distribution for the corresponding location. e resulting distribution is both more precise, and more accurate, as we can see in Figure 7c . e simulation suggests that accuracy of camera-based navigation can be improved substantially by taking into account other information that is available on-board a drone during a ight, even when the drone is controlled autonomously. We note that, even though Figure 7c shows fusion improving the C PS L location estimate, Figure 7b is a particularly imprecise example, and there are situations when the fusion will instead correct the location estimate obtained from the control signal. is is because the la er is subject to dri , due to external forces acting on the drone, aside from the actuation that the controller dictates.
A computation agent matches photos taken by the drone with the database to compute the conditional probability p(s |q) that the drone is at location s given photo q.
is probability is computed by C PS L [20] in the experiments reported in Section 4; we note that any program with a Python interface can be inserted easily into the the computation agent to replace C PS L with another localization algorithm.
Several factors contribute to uncertainty in the location distribution output by C PS L . If the query image depicts an area that does not possess unique features, then the resulting distribution will be spread out across the map, re ecting the locations where such features are present. However, physical constraints, such as the previous location of the drone and the plan that was used to control the drone since then, dictate that some of those possible locations are unrealistic. is intuition is realized in the updating scheme implemented by the fusion agent, whereby the previous location distribution, updated with respect to the control signal (by the Predict agent) is fused with the current C PS L location estimate.
Fusion Agent: GPS
e GPS fusion agent reads a signal from its sensor, which is assumed to coincide with the ground truth location with a high probability p GPS . us, compared to the inexact information obtained from the C PS L agent, the GPS signal plays the role of an oracle for the location, but does so at the cost of consuming additional resources. e error is assumed to be uniformly distributed over its eight neighboring locations, which are each assigned a probability of 1−p GPS 8 .
Check Violation Agents
A drone is a resource-constrained system. Aside from navigation, its on-board energy resources are used for propulsion, to power sensors and communications equipment, and to perform computation needed for the drone's mission. Under these circumstances, it is of interest to use cheaper alternatives to resource-intensive processes, such as positioning, whenever possible. Yet, when the risk of some harm is deemed su ciently high, resources should be used to mitigate the risk. Managing this tradeo is the job of a check-violation agent.
A check-violation agent uses (z) (de ned in Equation 1) to compute the probability that the drone will enter a no-y zone in [T ,T + H ]. is agent also checks the availability of resources required to acquire and process additional sensor data. If the probability of violating constraints is low then the agent generates a continue signal and the drone continues its planned acceleration. Otherwise, if su cient resources (energy, computational power) are available, the agent requests that the system acquire location information from the GPS sensor to improve the drone's location estimate. If the probability of violating constraints is unacceptable and insu cient resources are available, the agent generates an event signaling that a correction is required. e optimal strategy for the check-violation agent is complex and the experiments use a simpler heuristic. If the probability of violation is low then the agent outputs a continue message regardless of the availability of resources. Else, if the amounts of resources available exceed a threshold then the agent outputs a request to get additional data. is data should produce be er estimates (in some cases, images may be taken for goals other than navigation; in these cases the agent requests use of the images). Finally, if the agent determines that violation is likely and that resources are insu cient, then the agent outputs a message instructing the drone to take corrective action. Figure 7d illustrates the predictions (blue rectangles) generated by the Check Violation agent, and resulting corrective control action (red line). e assurance monitor makes decisions based on predictions over a time horizon H into the future. Based on H , and the location distribution L T at the current time T obtained from the corresponding fusion agent, a sequence F [T ,T +H ] of location distributions for the time interval [T ,T + H ] is computed from L T by propagating the control plan a(t), augmented by an estimate of future perturbations b(t), up to time T + H . e trajectory map F [T ,T +H ] is a sequence of location distributions F 0 , F 1 , . . . , F H −1 , computed using the distribution propagation map G as follows:
where a(t) and b(t) are time-indexed sequences of spatial displacements, and e(L, x, ) is a noise term by which the probability at location (x, ) dissipates into its neighboring locations with a given probability.
EXPERIMENTS IN ASSURANCE MONITORING
To demonstrate the behavior of an assurance monitor, we review a simulation of the drone navigation application described in the previous section. In this simulation, the drone should follow a straight-line trajectory between two points A and B, at either side of the known terrain illustrated in Figure 7a . is terrain is represented as a grid of images in the database, constructed by partitioning a high-resolution aerial photograph of the terrain into 20 × 24 tiles. Each tile is associated with the location at its center point. While the photograph is taken in good weather, the simulation assumes that the drone is ying in less favorable conditions. us, in the images that are available for navigation, parts of the terrain is obscured by clouds, making the camera-based navigation task harder, and the location distribution reported by C PS L more uncertain. e controller's planned actions are represented by a list of velocities for the remainder of the ight. During the ight, wind and actuation inaccuracies take the drone o its planned trajectory.
is is simulated by a random perturbation that is added to the control velocities at every step of the simulation.
Locations more than two tiles away from the planned trajectory are considered a no-y zone, colored in red. e job of the assurance monitor is to predict that the drone may enter this zoneas a result of incorrect control, the past history of perturbations -and initiate corrective control. To avoid unnecessary avoidance maneuvers due to uncertainty about the location of the drone, the assurance monitor implements a policy that activates the GPS when the remaining resources exceed a threshold, which is a function of the remaining energy resources and ight duration.
Assurance
e opacity of the blue rectangles in Figure 7d re ect the densities of locations in F [T ,T +H ] . e probability of entering the no-y zone is de ned as the greatest density among all locations in F [T ,T +H ] that are also in the no-y zone. Figure 7d shows a step in the simulation where this probability exceeds the 5% threshold for an assurance violation, causing the system to generate a corrective control action. To take into account uncertainty about the current state of the system, the assurance monitor performs its predictions based on distributions. However, a single control action must be passed to the controller. us, the revised control plan (red line) is computed based on the mean location, which can be seen to take the drone to the target location B along a safer trajectory, further away from the no-y zone, compared to the original control plan (black line). Table 1 shows an extract from an execution of the simulation that exhibits di erent signals produced by C PS L and GPS check violation (CV) agents. Up to time 12, the C PS L fusion actor's location estimate su ces to yield a sequence of "Continue" decisions from the C PS L CV agent. At time 13 the drone is taken o -course by wind. e probability of entering the no-y zone remains under the 5% threshold over the next two steps, which again yields "Continue" signals from the C PS L CV agent. At time 15, wind again moves the drone. is time, the trajectory distribution indicates a high (30.9%) probability of entering the no-y zone. Because su cient resources remain, the C PS L CV agent produces the "More Data" signal. e subsequent GPS reading is su ciently precise that the probability of entering the no-y zone falls back below the threshold, and the GPS CV agent produces a "Continue" signal. However, at the next step, both the C PS L and GPS CV agents predict a high risk of assurance violation, and the GPS CV agent produces a "Change" signal to redirect the drone to a safe trajectory. Over the next three steps, the drone moves away from the no-y zone along the revised, safe trajectory. e trajectory estimates re ect the successively falling probability of entering the no-y zone during these steps. e experiment described in this section uses assurance criteria based on the system's physical location. e assurance criterion could easily be extended to depend on more abstract states, such as temperature, current, power, latency or remaining resources, using the same pa ern to avoid that it is violated. (Figure 3) . Tracking airplanes and taking appropriate action using Kalman lters is an example of the assurance monitoring pa ern that is very widely used. e pa ern is also used in nance where the constraints are on deviation of the performance of a stock portfolio from benchmarks of the broad stock exchange. In this section, we review an example from sensor networks. Our goal is limited to showing how the same pa ern occurs in a very di erent context from that covered in Section 3.
Some event-based applications require the assurance that events are timestamped accurately. For example, accurate timestamps are necessary in applications that analyze mechanical or seismological structures by computing relative accelerations of structural components [6] . In some cases, computers a ached to sensors -such as those in utility closets in building basements -do not have access to GPS, and in these cases, timestamps are obtained from local system clocks in the computer. e accuracy of timestamps can be improved by using NTP services; however, the use of such services requires communication and computation which can be scarce resources on embedded computers that also have to perform other tasks.
A constraint for the application is that the time reported by the local clock can deviate from the true time by no more than a speci ed limit. e application is required to provide the assurance that this constraint is never violated or is violated only with very low probability.
Using the local clock is inexpensive compared with using the NTP server, and so the application determines when to call NTP. In this application, the resource that has to be managed is the amount of bandwidth and computation used by the application whereas in drone navigation the resources were ba ery power and computational load.
Many di erent algorithms have been used to improve accuracy of timestamps; here we give an example to illustrate the use of the assurance monitor pa ern. Figure 8 depicts an agent network for such an application, which uses two sources for time: a local computer clock and an NTP server.
e Local clock source agent receives timestamps from the local clock and the NTP clock source agent receives more accurate timestamps from an NTP server. e fusion agent integrates the information it receives from both the local clock and the NTP server to estimate the deviation of the local clock from the true time at every instant.
A prediction agent gets parameters from the fusion agent and predicts the probability distribution of the deviation as it changes with time. A check-violation agent determines when the probability of violating constraints will become unacceptably high and it also keeps track of the amount of resources that are available. If su cient resources (e.g. bandwidth) are available, then an NTP service is invoked before the constraint is violated. When resources are not scarce the service is called frequently whereas when resources are tight, the service is called only when needed.
Next, we discuss one of may possible algorithms for the agents in the application. e deviation of the true time from the local clock reading, illustrated in Figure 9 , is a random variable W t at time t. is random variable can be modeled as a Wiener process with dri µ and in nitesimal variance σ 2 . en W t +T − W t is a random variable which has a normal distribution with mean µT and variance σ 2 T . For example, if µ = −0.01 and σ 2 = 0.02 then a er 600 seconds have elapsed, the elapsed time according to the local clock is a random variable with a normal distribution with mean 594 and variance 12.
e fusion agent estimates µ and σ from a window of a xed number of previous measurements. e calculation is based on the assumptions that the Network Time Protocol (NTP) server is perfectly accurate. Suppose the NTP server has been invoked when the local clock reads [t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t M ]. Let the NTP server reading be T j when the local clock is at t j . We focus on estimating the elapsed time between two events rather than on the absolute time. We use the set of data points (t j ,T j ) to estimate µ and σ of the Wiener process. is set of points is a moving window, and now we focus on the calculation for one window. e elapsed time local clock times from the initial point (i.e. the point at which the local clock read t 0 ) are: [(t 1 − t 0 ), (t 2 − t 0 ), . . . , (t M − t 0 )], and the elapsed times as given by the NTP server at these points are
Plot the points (t j − t 0 ,T j − T 0 ) on an x − plane, and obtain a regression line that passes through the origin. e slope of the regression line is an estimate of parameter µ of the Wiener process. en,
where ϵ j is an error term. Consider a time interval where the local clock reads t at the beginning of the interval and t at the end of the interval, where t 0 ≤ t ≤ t ≤ t M . De ne the corrected elapsed local time for this interval as:
For the interval in which the local clock reads t j−1 at the start of the interval and t j at the end, we have:
and therefore:
So ϵ j is the error between the true and corrected local clock elapsed times for the j-th interval. From the assumptions of a Wiener process, the random variables of non-overlapping intervals are independent. Each ϵ j is a single sample value of a random variable which has a normal distribution with zero mean and variance (T j − T j−1 )σ 2 . All these random variables are independent of each other because the intervals are non-overlapping. Hence, the probability density of ge ing all the sample values ϵ 1 , ϵ 2 , . . . , ϵ M , is the product of these probabilty densities. We estimate the variance to be the value σ 2 that maximizes the likelihood of the set of observations ϵ j , all j. e maximum likelihood estimator for σ 2 is:
e estimate of σ is passed from the fusion agent to the prediction agent. e prediction agent has the responsibility of predicting the distribution of the deviation ϵ of the corrected local time from the true time, for every instant in the future. e check-violation agent has the responsibility of computing the probability that the deviation will exceed a speci ed limit for every point in the future. e check-violation agent then determines the future time a er which this probability exceeds a speci ed threshold. e NTP server must be read before this time to satisfy the assurance requirements.
In this example, the prediction agent and check-violation agent are simple and can be combined into a single, simple agent. Let t M be the local clock time when the NTP server was read most recently and let T M be the NTP value. Treat the point t M ,T M as the new origin and compute elapsed time from that point. When the elapsed time according to the local clock is t −t M then the corrected elapsed time is µ(t − t M ) where µ is the estimate for the dri . e deviation of the corrected time from the true time at a true time T is a random variable with zero mean and a variance of (T − T 0 )σ 2 where σ is estimated as described earlier. e agent has access to the local clok but doesn't know the true time T until it reads an NTP server; so, we use the following approximation. e deviation of the corrected time from the true time when the local clock is at t is a random variable with zero mean and a variance of (t − t 0 )σ 2 . Computing the local clock time at which the constraint is violated is now straightforward.
RELATED AND FUTURE WORK
A simple related pa ern that has already been identi ed by the event-based systems community is Event Monitor [19] . It describes a component that polls a system for state changes and noti es components that are registered with the event monitor, a variant of the observer pa ern where the event monitor acts as an intermediary for multiple components interested in monitoring eachother's state. In contrast, assurance monitors predict the occurrence of future events and act preemptively to prevent unwanted events from occurring. is trait is shared by the Event-based Learning pa ern [22] , though assurance monitors combine predictive models with control, that is, a means of enacting remedial actions, as well as means to stage these reactions to account for di erent event severity levels.
In our future work, we plan to investigate instances of the pa ern that use more sophisticated prediction agents that rely on extensive o ine training, such as deep neural networks. ese models have impressive predictive power but whose accuracy can be hard to reason about. To address this, we also plan to explore the issue of quantifying the accuracy of predictions used by assurance monitors, which is currently an area of active research [11, 25] .
CONCLUSION
We think a more formal use of design pa erns for event processing will be helpful as more event processing applications are developed. We described one design pa ern -the assurance monitor pa ern -for a class of event processing applications. We described one application, drone navigation, in detail, and showed how the assurance monitor pa ern can be used in other applications through a second example: time stamping. e pa ern, documentation, and related code are freely available. Work by the EBS community on design pa erns for event processing, including the development of an open library of pa erns, will be of great service to all who want to develop event-processing applications.
Why talk about pa erns when code that implements the pa ern is available? e code is only one instantiation of the pa ern. As we saw in the timestamp application, some components of the pa ern may become so trivial that they can be combined with other components. In some applications we may want to execute collections of components in parallel; for example we may want sensors to execute concurrently and push their readings to fusion agents. In other applications, we may want the code to execute within a single process and where the application pulls data from sensors; we ask the sensors to measure data only when we need it, as in the case of the GPS sensor for drone navigation. e range of implementation options is huge -e.g., single process versus multiprocess, push versus pull -but the idea of a common pa ern is helpful in developing each of the implementations.
Another reason for abstracting the pa ern is that it helps in teaching. Indeed, the books on event processing describe pa erns, though sometimes more implicitly than explicitly. We believe that more formal use of so ware design pa erns for event processing will help in teaching event-based systems and in propagating the research done by the community.
